Shopping on line can be easy, simple and save you lots of money. It can also take a lot of your time, frustrate you, and result in unwanted purchases. Now the same can be said for regular high street shopping, but with the vast opportunity presented by the Internet it will pay you to spend a few minutes reading this and understanding how to better optimize your Suez Crisis shopping experience:

1. Compare - without doubt the biggest advantage that the Suez Crisis offers shoppers today is the ability to compare thousands of Suez Crisis at a time. This is a great thing, but not necessarily all the time! Too much can be daunting at times so take advantage of the great comparison sites and where possible let them do the hard work for you.

2. Research - if it has been said it will be on the internet. Ignorance is no longer a justifiable reason for buying the wrong thing. Take the time to research in detail everything that you could possible want to know about

3. Testimonials - don't know anybody that has bought a Suez Crisis? Wrong! If the Suez Crisis is good the internet will let you know. Use the Internet as a friend and get testimonials before you buy.

4. Questions - Got a question about Suez Crisis then search the Forums, FAQ's, Blogs etc. Don't be afraid to ask .....

5. Reputation - Never heard of the company selling Suez Crisis? Don't worry, no reason why you should know every company in the world, but you know someone that does! Use the internet to find out what people are saying about Suez Crisis and build up a picture of their reputation for sales, returns, customer service, delivery etc.

6. Returns - still worried that even after all of the above your Suez Crisis wont be what you want? Check out the returns policy. There is so much competition now that someone, somewhere is bound to offer the terms that you are comfortable with.

7. Feedback - happy with your Suez Crisis then let people know, after all you are depending on others people input in your buying decision, so why not give a little back.

8. Security - check for the yellow padlock on the Suez Crisis site before you buy, and the s after http:/ /i.e. https:// = a secure site

9. Contact - got a question about Suez Crisis, or want to leave a comment then check out the sites contact page. Reputable companies have them and respond.

10. Payment - ready to pay for your Suez Crisis, then use your credit card or PayPal! Be aware of companies that don't accept them, there may be genuine reasons but given the huge amount of choice you have when buying online there is no reason at all not to buy via credit card or PayPal.

{{Warbox|conflict=Suez Crisis The Sinai War (Arab-Israeli conflict)], (Sinai and Suez Canal zone)] cease-fire.
United Nations Emergency Force occupation of Sinai.Military: Victory for Israel, Britain and France.
Political: Victory for Egypt.


|casus=Egyptian nationalization of the Suez Canal [United Kingdom FranceCharles KeightleyPierre Barjot|commander2=Gamal Abdel NasserAbdel Hakim Amer56 British KIA 91 British [Wounded In Action 10 French KIA 43 French WIA|casualties2=650 KIA 2,900 WIA 2,000 Prisoner of war|-->The Suez CrisisThe Suez Crisis is also known as the Suez War or 1956 War, commonly known in the Arab world as the Tripartite aggression; other names include the Sinai war, Suez-Sinai war, 1956 Arab-Israeli War, the Second Arab-Israeli War, Suez Campaign, Sinai Campaign, Kadesh Operation, and Operation Musketeer (; ; ) was a military attack on Egypt by United Kingdom, France, and Israel beginning on 29 October 1956.Damien Cash "Suez crisis" The Oxford Companion to Australian History. Ed. Graeme Davison, John Hirst and Stuart Macintyre. Oxford University Press, 2001.Roger Owen "Suez Crisis" The Oxford Companion to the Politics of the World, Second edition. Joel Krieger, ed. Oxford University Press Inc. 2001. The attack followed Egypt's decision of 26 July 1956 to nationalize the Suez canal after the withdrawal of an offer by Britain and the United States to fund the building of the Aswan Dam."Suez crisis" The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics. Ed. Iain McLean and Alistair McMillan. Oxford University Press, 2003.

Background The Suez Canal was opened in 1869, having been financed by the French and Egyptian governments. Technically, the territory of the canal proper was sovereign Egyptian territory, and the operating company, the Suez Canal Company (Suez Canal Company) was an Egyptian-chartered company, (originally part of the Ottoman Turkish Empire).

The canal was strategically important to the British, and hence to the other European powers. To the British, the canal was the ocean link with its colonies in India, the Far East, Australia, and New Zealand. Because the canal was strategically important, the area as a whole became strategically important. Thus, in 1875, the British government of Benjamin Disraeli bought the Egyptian share of the operating company, thus obtaining partial control of the canal's operations, which it shared with mostly-French private investors. In 1882, during intervention in Egypt, the United Kingdom took de facto control of the canal proper.

The Convention of Constantinople (1888) declared the canal a neutral zone under British protection. In ratifying it, the Ottoman Empire agreed to permit international shipping to freely pass through the canal, in time of war and peace.Howard M. Sachar. A History of Israel from the Rise of Zionism to Our Time. Published by Alfred A. Knopf (New York). 1976. ISBN 0-394-28564-5. As the successor of the Ottoman Empire, Egypt was bound by the treaty.

The Suez Canal proved its strategic importance during the Russo-Japanese War when the Japanese entered an agreement with the British. The Japanese launched a surprise attack on the Russian Pacific Fleet, based at Lüshunkou. When the Russians sent reinforcements from the Baltic, the British denied them access to the canal. This forced the Russian fleet to steam around the entire continent of Africa, giving the Japanese forces time to regroup and solidify their position in the area.

The importance of the canal as a strategic center was also apparent during both World Wars; in the First World War, the British and French closed the canal to non-Allied shipping, in the Second World War, it was tenaciously defended in the North African Campaign.

Petroleum business historian Daniel Yergin wrote:

n 1948, the canal abruptly lost its traditional rationale . . . . ontrol over the canal could no longer be preserved on grounds that it was critical to the defense either of India or of an empire that was being liquidated. And yet, at exactly the same moment, the canal was gaining a new role — as the highway not of empire, but of Petroleum . . . . By 1955, petroleum accounted for half of the canal's traffic, and, in turn, two thirds of Europe's oil passed through it.#References Yergin Page 480

In 1948, British troops were withdrawn from Palestine, and the state of Israel formally established, leading to the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, which further established both Israel's independence and Arab-Israeli enmity. See history of Israel, history of Egypt.

In 1952, Egyptian Army officers deposed the monarchy of Farouk I of Egypt, an ally of the British. Their new government abandoned policies friendly to the European powers, while simultaneously asserting an independent and Arab nationalist identity.

Events leading to and precipitating the Crisis The State of the Canal The events that contributed most to the Suez Canal Crisis were the nationalization and closing of the canal. In 1949, Egypt closed the canal to Israeli shipping, and blockaded the Gulf of Aqaba, in contradiction to the terms of the Constantinople Convention of Constantinople of 1888. Many argued that action also violated the Rhodes armistice agreement.Howard M. Sachar. A History of Israel from the Rise of Zionism to Our TimePublished by Alfred A. Knopf (New York). 1976. p. 455. ISBN 0-394-28564-5. Dr. Ralph J. Bunche, speaking to the United Nations Security Council said, "There should be free movement for legitimate shipping, and no vestiges of the wartime blockade should be allowed to remain, as they are inconsistent with both the letter and spirit of the Armistice Agreement".

In August, 1951, British Foreign minister Anthony Eden declared that Egyptian liberty to close the canal implied Israel's right to traverse the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba, since those conditions were "contingent and reciprocal" in the armistice between the two nations. Indeed, his argument persuaded the international community; on September 1, 1951, the UN Security Council passed United Nations Security Council Resolution 95, which called the closure of the Suez Canal "an abuse of the exercise of the right of visit, search and seizure" and an "unjustified interference with the rights of nations to navigate the seas and to trade freely with one another," and called upon Egypt "to terminate the restrictions on the passage of international commercial shipping and goods through the Suez Canal." Under this pressure, Egypt eased its restrictions on travel through the canal. However, it gradually reimposed them the following year.

Although the UK had gained control of the canal with the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936, Egypt declared the treaty null and void in 1951. By 1954, the UK agreed to withdraw from the canal zone. On July 26, 1956, Egypt announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company, in which British banks and business held a 44 per cent stake. The nationalization was realised to raise revenue for building the Aswan High Dam on the Nile River. The US and the UK previously had agreed to help pay for the project, but cancelled their support after Egypt bought battle tanks from communist Czechoslovakia, and diplomatically recognised the People's Republic of China.

Prime Minister Eden tried persuading the British public of the need for war, and attempted World War II-era patriotism when he compared Nasser's nationalisation of the Suez Canal with the nationalism of Benito Mussolini and Adolf Hitler of twenty years earlier, however, the very first dictatorial comparisons, of Nasser with 1930s dictators, during the crisis were by the Labour Party (UK) Opposition leader, Hugh Gaitskell. Eden had staunchly opposed Neville Chamberlain's appeasement policies, claiming that a forceful display was needed to prevent Nasser becoming an expansionist military threat.

Arab Economic Pressure on Israel In order to pressure Israel, the Arab world commenced a series of economic sanctions against it in the early 1950s. Amongst other actions, Israel's neighbors all but sealed their borders, and thoroughly severed all forms of transportation and communication across them. The Arab world closed its ports to Israeli shipping, as well as to ships originating from or destined for Israeli ports. This action made shipping to Israel almost unfeasible, since Israel would have to be the only stop in the region for a ship which anchored there. All flights departing from, landing in or passing through Israel were forbidden from passing over Arab air space. Individuals who had an Israeli visa in their passport were refused entry into Arab countries. Arab governments also pursued a campaign designed to dissuade private companies from doing business with Israel, and put a good deal of pressure on other governments to participate in their embargo. In July, 1950, Egypt passed a law requiring that the captains of ships passing through Egyptian ports guarantee that their cargo was intended for local consumption at their port of immediate destination. These restrictions were designed to prevent such cargo from being shipped to Israel from neutral ports. While all these measures had some effect on the Israeli economy,Howard M. Sachar. A History of Israel from the Rise of Zionism to Our TimePublished by Alfred A. Knopf (New York). 1976. pp. 453-6. ISBN 0-394-28564-5. Israel's economic growth nevertheless remained strong. Israel's economic growth: success without security - MERIA Journal Vol. 6 No. 3 September 2002

Egyptian Arms Deal In 1955, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser imported arms from the Soviet bloc to build his arsenal for the confrontation with Israel. He announced it on August 31, 1955:Egypt has decided to dispatch her heroes, the disciples of pharaoh and the sons of Islam and they will cleanse the Land of Israel. ... There will be no peace on Israel's border because we demand vengeance, and vengeance is Israel's death.

Under the terms of this deal, Czechoslovakia sold Egypt 200 tanks, 150 artillery pieces, 120 MiG jet fighters, 50 jet bombers, 20 transport planes, 15 minesweepers, 2 destroyers, 2 submarines, hundreds of vehicles and thousands of modern rifles and machine guns. Although the arms were to be delivered promptly, Egypt paid for them over the span of twelve years with shipments of cotton to the Soviet bloc. This volume of arms was unlike any the Middle East had ever seen, and it was coupled with the sale of 100 tanks, 100 MiG fighters and hundreds of other items to Syria, as well as the provision of Soviet and Czechoslovakian trainers and assistance personnel. This sudden change in local balance of power pressured Israel to act quickly, and acted as a catalyst to the Suez Canal Crisis.Howard M. Sachar. A History of Israel from the Rise of Zionism to Our TimePublished by Alfred A. Knopf (New York). 1976. p. 474. ISBN 0-394-28564-5.

Egyptian Influence in the Arab World Nasser's apparent role in the dismissal of British military leader Glubb Pasha in Jordan prior to the canal company nationalization had greatly annoyed British Prime Minister Anthony Eden.

The French were befouled by Nasser's support for Muslim insurgents in French Algeria. Similar to the British, the French news called Nasser a "dictator".

Anglo-Franco-American Diplomacy The The Free World opened a discussion on August 1, with a tripartite meeting at 10 Downing Street between British Foreign Affairs Secretary Selwyn Lloyd, U.S. Ambassador Robert Daniel Murphy and French Foreign Affairs Minister Christian Pineau Le Canal de Suez et la nationalisation par le Colonel Nasser, Les Actualité Française - AF, 08.01.1956

Soon an alliance was formed between Eden and French Prime Minister Guy Mollet, with headquarters based in London. Chief of Staff was made of General Stockwell and Admiral Barjot. The United Kingdom sought cooperation with the United States throughout 1956 to deal with what it maintained was a threat of Israeli attack against Egypt, to little effect.

Between July and October 1956, unsuccessful initiatives encouraged by the United States were made to reduce the tensions that would ultimately lead to war. International conferences were organized to secure agreement on canal operations; all were ultimately fruitless.

Meanwhile, France used its secret connection with Israel, which was the only option for British-French joint intervention, even though the United States nuclear umbrella was deactivated. French Minister of Defense archives ECPAD, La distribution de vivres à la population civile de Port Saïd et de Port Fouad, lors de l'expédition de Suez. MO56137A

Protocol of Sèvres Three months after Egypt's nationalization of the canal company, a secret meeting took place at Sèvres, outside Paris. Britain and France enlisted Israeli support for an alliance against Egypt. The parties agreed that Israel would invade the Sinai. Britain and France would then intervene, instructing that both the Israeli and Egyptian armies withdraw their forces to a distance of 16 Kilometer from either side of the canal. The British and French would then argue that Egypt's control of such an important route was too tenuous, and that it need be placed under Anglo-French management.

The interests of the parties were various. Britain was anxious lest it lose access to the remains of its empire. France was nervous about the growing influence that Nasser exerted on its North African colonies and protectorates. Both Britain and France were eager that the canal should remain open as an important conduit of oil. Israel wanted to reopen the canal to Israeli shipping, and saw the opportunity to strengthen its southern border and to weaken a dangerous and hostile state.

Prior to the operation Britain deliberately neglected to take counsel with the Americans, trusting instead that Nasser's engagement with communist states would persuade the Americans to accept British and French actions if they were presented as a fait accompli. This proved to be a fatal miscalculation for the colonial powers.

Invasion Operation Kadesh: The Israeli Operation in the Sinai Peninsula Israeli military planning for the operation in the Sinai hinged on four main military objectives; Sharm el-Sheikh, al-Arish, Abu Uwayulah, and the Gaza Strip. The Egyptian blockade of the Tiran Straits was based at Sharm el-Sheikh, and by capturing the town, Israel would have access to the Red Sea for the first time since 1953, which would allow it to restore the trade benefits of secure passage to the Indian Ocean. The Gaza Strip was chosen as another military objective because Israel wished to remove the training grounds for Fedayeen groups, and because Israel recognised that Egypt could use the territory as a staging ground for attacks against the advancing Israeli troops. Israel advocated rapid advances, for which a potential Egyptian flanking manoeuvre would present even more of a risk. al-Arish and Abu Uwayulah were important hubs for soldiers, equipment, and centres of command and control of the Egyptian Army in the Sinai. Capturing them would deal a deathblow to the Egyptian's strategic operation in the entire Peninsula. The capture of these four objectives were hoped to be the means by which the entire Egyptian Army would rout, and fall back into Egypt proper, which British and French forces would then be able to push up against an Israeli advance, and crush in a decisive encounter.

Early Actions in southern Sinai The Israeli's chief-of-staff, Major General Moshe Dayan, first planned to take the vital Mitla Pass. Dayan planned for the 1st Battalion, 202nd Paratroop Brigade, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Rafael Eytan, a veteran of the Israel War of Independence, and future head of the IDF; to drop at Parker's Memorial, near one of the defiles of the pass, Jebel Heitan. The rest of the brigade, under the command of Colonel Ariel Sharon would then advance to meet with the battalion, and consolidate their holdings.

On the 29 October 1956, Operation Kadesh, the conquest of the Sinai, began when the battalion dropped into the Peninsula. However, the landing had not gone as planned, and the forces were now several miles from their target, and wasted valuable hours, and physical energy, moving into their positions opposite the Egyptian positions in the pass. The Israelis then dug in, received artillery and weapons from another airlift, and awaited the rest of the brigade.

Early actions along the Gulf of Aqaba, and the central front Meanwhile, the 9th Infantry Brigade captured Ras an-Naqb, an important staging ground for that brigade's later attack against Sharm el-Sheikh. Instead of attacking the town by a frontal attack, they enveloped the town, and negotiated through some of the natural chokepoints into the rear of the town, and surprised the Egyptians before they could ready themselves to defend. The Egyptians surrendered, with no Israeli casualties sustained.

The 4th Infantry Brigade, under the command of Colonel Josef Harpaz, captured al-Qusaymah, which would be used as a jumping off point for the assault against Abu Uwayulah.

Battle of Jebel Heitan, 202nd Paratroop Brigade under attack The portion of the 202nd under Sharon's command continued to advance to meet with the 1st Brigade. En route, Sharon assaulted Themed, and was able to storm the town through the Themed Gap, and was able to capture the settlement. On the 30th, Sharon linked up with Eytan near Nakla.

Dayan had no more plans for further advances beyond the passes, but Sharon decided to attack the Egyptian positions at Jebel Heitan. Sharon would send his lightly armed paratroopers against dug-in Egyptians supported by air and heavy artillery, as well as tanks. Although the Israelis succeeded in forcing the Egyptians to retreat, the heavy casualties sustained would surround Sharon with a lot of controversy. Most of the deaths sustained by the Israelis in the entire operation, were sustained at Jebel Heitan.

Anglo-French Task Force To support the invasion, large air forces had been deployed to Cyprus and Malta by the UK and France and many aircraft carriers were deployed. The two airbases on Cyprus were so congested that a third field which was in dubious condition had to be brought into use for French aircraft. Even RAF Luqa on Malta was extremely crowded with RAF Bomber Command aircraft. The UK deployed the aircraft carriers HMS HMS Eagle (R05), HMS Albion (R07) and HMS Bulwark (R08) and France had the Arromanches (R 95) and La Fayette (R96) on station. In addition, HMS HMS Ocean (R68) and HMS Theseus (R64) acted as jumping-off points for Britain's helicopter-borne assault (the world's first). Meanwhile the Israel Border Police militarized the Israel-Jordan border (including the Green Line with the West Bank) which resulted in the killing of 48 Arab civilians by Israeli forces on October 29 (known as the Kafr Qasim massacre).

On October 30, in the morning, United Kingdom and France sent an ultimatum to Egypt. They initiated Operation Musketeer (1956) on October 31, with a bombing campaign. On November 3, 20 F4U Corsair from the 14.F and 15.F Aéronavale taking off from the Arromanches and Lafayette carriers, attacked the Cairo aerodrome. Nasser responded by sinking all 40 ships present in the canal, closing it to further shipping until early 1957.

On late November 5, the 3rd Battalion of the British Parachute Regiment (United Kingdom) dropped at El Gamil Airfield, clearing the area and establishing a secure base for incoming support aircraft and reinforcements. At first light on November 6, British Commandos of Nos 42 and 40 Commando Royal Marines stormed the beaches, using landing craft of World War II vintage (LCM Landing Craft, Mechanized). The battlegroup standing offshore opened fire, giving covering fire for the landings and causing considerable damage to the Egyptian batteries and gun emplacements. The town of Port Said sustained great damage and was seen to be alight.

. October 1956Acting in concert with British forces, 500 heavily-armed paratroopers of the French 2nd Marine Infantry Parachute Regiment (2ème RPC), hastily redeployed from combat in Algeria, jumped over the al-Raswa bridges from Nord Noratlas transports of the ET (Escadrille de Transport) 1/61 and ET 3/61, together with some combat engineers of the Guards Independent Parachute Company. Despite the loss of two soldiers, the western bridge was swiftly secured by the paras, and F4U Corsairs of the Aéronavale 14.F and 15.F flew a series of close-air-support missions, destroying several SU-100 tank destroyers. F-84Fs also hit two large oil storage tanks in Port Said, which went up in flames and covered most of the city in a thick cloud of smoke for the next several days. Egyptian resistance varied, with some positions fighting back until destroyed, while others were abandoned with little resistance.

In the afternoon, 522 additional French paras of the 1er REP (Régiment Étranger Parachutiste, 1st French Foreign Legion Parachute Regiment) were dropped near Port Fouad. These were also constantly supported by the Corsairs of the French Aéronavale, which flew very intensive operations: for example, although the French carrier LaFayette developed catapult problems, no less than 40 combat sorties were completed. In total, 10 French soldiers were killed and 30 injured during the landing and the subsequent battles.

British commandos of No. 45 Commando assaulted by helicopter, meeting stiff resistance, with shore batteries striking several helicopters, while friendly fire from British carrier-borne aircraft caused heavy casualties to 45 Commando and HQ. Street fighting and house clearing, with strong opposition from well-entrenched Egyptian sniper positions, caused further casualties.

End of Hostilities The operation to take the canal was highly successful from a military point of view, but was a political disaster due to external forces. Along with Suez, the United States was also dealing with the near-simultaneous Soviet Union-1956 Hungarian revolution, and faced the public relations embarrassment of criticizing the Soviet Union's military intervention there while at the same time avoiding criticism of its two principal European allies' actions. Perhaps more significantly, the United States also feared a wider war after the Soviet Union leader Nikita Khrushchev threatened to intervene on the Egyptian side and launch attacks by "all types of weapons of destruction" on London and Paris.

Thus, the President Eisenhower forced a cease-fire on Britain and France which it had previously told the Allies it would not do. The U.S. demanded that the invasion stop and sponsored resolutions in the UN Security Council for a cease-fire to stop the invasion. Britain and France, as permanent members of the Security Council, vetoed the resolutions in the UN Security Council. The U.S. then appealed to the United Nations General Assembly and proposed a resolution calling for a cease-fire and a withdrawal of forces under the terms of Uniting for Peace (UfP). The General Assembly held an emergency session and passed the UfP resolution. Britain and France withdrew from Egypt within a week.Z Magazine, April 2, 2003, http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?SectionID=1&ItemID=3376 last visited 2/28/07

Part of the pressure that the United States used against Britain was financial, as President Eisenhower threatened to sell the United States Reserve currency of the British pound and thereby precipitate a collapse of the British currency. After Saudi Arabia started an oil embargo against Britain and France, the U.S. refused to fill the gap, until Britain and France agreed to a rapid withdrawal.Kennett Love, Suez: The Twice-Fought War, New York: McGraw Hill, 1969, p.651 There was also a measure of discouragement for Britain in the rebuke by the Commonwealth of Nations Prime Ministers Louis St. Laurent of Canada and Robert Menzies of Australia at a time when Britain was still continuing to regard the Commonwealth as an entity of importance as the residue of the British Empire and as an automatic supporter in its effort to remain a world power.

The British government and the Pound Sterling thus both came under pressure. Eden was forced to resign and announced a cease fire on November 6, warning neither France nor Israel beforehand. Troops were still in Port Said when the order came from London. Without further guarantee, the Anglo-French Task Force had to finish withdrawing by December 22, 1956, to be replaced by Denmark and Colombian units of the United Nations Emergency Force. Service Cinématographique des Armées SCA reportage de Paul Corcuff, December 22nd 1956 French Ministry of Defense arcvhives ECPAD MO56141AR14 The Israelis left the Sinai in March, 1957.

Introduction of UN Peacekeepers Before the withdrawal, Lester B. Pearson, who would later become the Prime Minister of Canada, had gone to the United Nations and suggested creating a United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) in the Suez to "keep the borders at peace while a political settlement is being worked out." The United Nations accepted this suggestion, and after several days of tense diplomacy, a neutral force not involving the United States, Britain, France or most of the Soviet Bloc was sent with the consent of Nasser, stabilizing conditions in the area. Pearson was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1957 for his efforts. The United Nations Peacekeeping Force was Pearson's creation and he is considered the father of the modern concept of "peacekeeping".

Aftermath Eden's resignation marked, until the Falklands War, the last significant attempt Britain made to impose its military will abroad without U.S. support. However, Nigel Ashton argues "that British strategy in the region changed very little in the wake of Suez." Harold Macmillan was every bit as determined as Eden had been to stop Nasser, although he was more willing to enlist American support in the future for that end. Some argue that the crisis also marked the final transfer of power to the new superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union.

The incident demonstrated the weakness of the NATO alliance in its lack of planning and cooperation beyond the European stage. From the point of view of General Charles de Gaulle, the Suez events demonstrated that France could not rely on allies anymore. Britain withdrew its troops in the midst of the battle without warning its allies. In 1957, following these events, the French government launched an autonomous nuclear programme conducted in the Sahara,http://www.defense.gouv.fr/content/download/60823/571529/file/SAHARA.pdf Délégation à l’Information et à la Communication de la Défense: Dossier de présentation des essais nucléaireset leur suivi au Sahara, French Defense Ministry, January 2007 known as Force de frappe, as a deterrent not only against the USSR but vis-à-vis every potential threat around the globe. By 1966 de Gaulle withdrew France from the integrated NATO military command. According to the protocol of Sèvres agreements, France secretly transmitted parts of its Gerboise Bleue to Israel, including a detonator. Affaire de Suez, Le Pacte Secret, Peter Hercombe et Arnaud Hamelin, France 5/Sunset Presse/Transparence, 2006

The imposed end to the crisis signalled the definitive weakening of the United Kingdom and France as Global Powers. Nasser's standing in the Arab world was greatly improved, with his stance helping to promote pan-Arabism and reinforce hostility against Israel and the West. The crisis also arguably hastened the process of decolonization, as the remaining colonies of both Britain and France gained independence over the next several years.

After Suez, Aden and Iraq became the main bases for the British in the region while the French concentrated their forces at Bizerte and Beirut. - Israel border in 1962.UNEF was placed in the Sinai (on Egyptian territory only) with the express purpose of maintaining the cease-fire. While effective in preventing the small-scale warfare that prevailed before 1956 and after 1967, budgetary cutbacks and changing needs had seen the force shrink to 3,378 by 1967. The Egyptian government then began to Militarization the Sinai, and demanded that the UNEF withdraw. This action, along with the blockade of the Strait of Tiran, led directly to the Six Day War. During the war, Israeli armed forces captured the east bank of the canal, which subsequently became a de facto boundary between Egypt and Israel and the canal was therefore closed until June, 1975.

Bibliography

References See also

Media links

External links

{{Warbox|conflict=Suez Crisis The Sinai War (Arab-Israeli conflict)], (Sinai and Suez Canal zone)] cease-fire.
United Nations Emergency Force occupation of Sinai.Military: Victory for Israel, Britain and France.
Political: Victory for Egypt.


|casus=Egyptian nationalization of the Suez Canal [United Kingdom FranceCharles KeightleyPierre Barjot|commander2=Gamal Abdel NasserAbdel Hakim Amer56 British KIA 91 British [Wounded In Action 10 French KIA 43 French WIA|casualties2=650 KIA 2,900 WIA 2,000 Prisoner of war|-->The Suez CrisisThe Suez Crisis is also known as the Suez War or 1956 War, commonly known in the Arab world as the Tripartite aggression; other names include the Sinai war, Suez-Sinai war, 1956 Arab-Israeli War, the Second Arab-Israeli War, Suez Campaign, Sinai Campaign, Kadesh Operation, and Operation Musketeer (; ; ) was a military attack on Egypt by United Kingdom, France, and Israel beginning on 29 October 1956.Damien Cash "Suez crisis" The Oxford Companion to Australian History. Ed. Graeme Davison, John Hirst and Stuart Macintyre. Oxford University Press, 2001.Roger Owen "Suez Crisis" The Oxford Companion to the Politics of the World, Second edition. Joel Krieger, ed. Oxford University Press Inc. 2001. The attack followed Egypt's decision of 26 July 1956 to nationalize the Suez canal after the withdrawal of an offer by Britain and the United States to fund the building of the Aswan Dam."Suez crisis" The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics. Ed. Iain McLean and Alistair McMillan. Oxford University Press, 2003.

Background The Suez Canal was opened in 1869, having been financed by the French and Egyptian governments. Technically, the territory of the canal proper was sovereign Egyptian territory, and the operating company, the Suez Canal Company (Suez Canal Company) was an Egyptian-chartered company, (originally part of the Ottoman Turkish Empire).

The canal was strategically important to the British, and hence to the other European powers. To the British, the canal was the ocean link with its colonies in India, the Far East, Australia, and New Zealand. Because the canal was strategically important, the area as a whole became strategically important. Thus, in 1875, the British government of Benjamin Disraeli bought the Egyptian share of the operating company, thus obtaining partial control of the canal's operations, which it shared with mostly-French private investors. In 1882, during intervention in Egypt, the United Kingdom took de facto control of the canal proper.

The Convention of Constantinople (1888) declared the canal a neutral zone under British protection. In ratifying it, the Ottoman Empire agreed to permit international shipping to freely pass through the canal, in time of war and peace.Howard M. Sachar. A History of Israel from the Rise of Zionism to Our Time. Published by Alfred A. Knopf (New York). 1976. ISBN 0-394-28564-5. As the successor of the Ottoman Empire, Egypt was bound by the treaty.

The Suez Canal proved its strategic importance during the Russo-Japanese War when the Japanese entered an agreement with the British. The Japanese launched a surprise attack on the Russian Pacific Fleet, based at Lüshunkou. When the Russians sent reinforcements from the Baltic, the British denied them access to the canal. This forced the Russian fleet to steam around the entire continent of Africa, giving the Japanese forces time to regroup and solidify their position in the area.

The importance of the canal as a strategic center was also apparent during both World Wars; in the First World War, the British and French closed the canal to non-Allied shipping, in the Second World War, it was tenaciously defended in the North African Campaign.

Petroleum business historian Daniel Yergin wrote:

n 1948, the canal abruptly lost its traditional rationale . . . . ontrol over the canal could no longer be preserved on grounds that it was critical to the defense either of India or of an empire that was being liquidated. And yet, at exactly the same moment, the canal was gaining a new role — as the highway not of empire, but of Petroleum . . . . By 1955, petroleum accounted for half of the canal's traffic, and, in turn, two thirds of Europe's oil passed through it.#References Yergin Page 480

In 1948, British troops were withdrawn from Palestine, and the state of Israel formally established, leading to the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, which further established both Israel's independence and Arab-Israeli enmity. See history of Israel, history of Egypt.

In 1952, Egyptian Army officers deposed the monarchy of Farouk I of Egypt, an ally of the British. Their new government abandoned policies friendly to the European powers, while simultaneously asserting an independent and Arab nationalist identity.

Events leading to and precipitating the Crisis The State of the Canal The events that contributed most to the Suez Canal Crisis were the nationalization and closing of the canal. In 1949, Egypt closed the canal to Israeli shipping, and blockaded the Gulf of Aqaba, in contradiction to the terms of the Constantinople Convention of Constantinople of 1888. Many argued that action also violated the Rhodes armistice agreement.Howard M. Sachar. A History of Israel from the Rise of Zionism to Our TimePublished by Alfred A. Knopf (New York). 1976. p. 455. ISBN 0-394-28564-5. Dr. Ralph J. Bunche, speaking to the United Nations Security Council said, "There should be free movement for legitimate shipping, and no vestiges of the wartime blockade should be allowed to remain, as they are inconsistent with both the letter and spirit of the Armistice Agreement".

In August, 1951, British Foreign minister Anthony Eden declared that Egyptian liberty to close the canal implied Israel's right to traverse the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba, since those conditions were "contingent and reciprocal" in the armistice between the two nations. Indeed, his argument persuaded the international community; on September 1, 1951, the UN Security Council passed United Nations Security Council Resolution 95, which called the closure of the Suez Canal "an abuse of the exercise of the right of visit, search and seizure" and an "unjustified interference with the rights of nations to navigate the seas and to trade freely with one another," and called upon Egypt "to terminate the restrictions on the passage of international commercial shipping and goods through the Suez Canal." Under this pressure, Egypt eased its restrictions on travel through the canal. However, it gradually reimposed them the following year.

Although the UK had gained control of the canal with the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936, Egypt declared the treaty null and void in 1951. By 1954, the UK agreed to withdraw from the canal zone. On July 26, 1956, Egypt announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company, in which British banks and business held a 44 per cent stake. The nationalization was realised to raise revenue for building the Aswan High Dam on the Nile River. The US and the UK previously had agreed to help pay for the project, but cancelled their support after Egypt bought battle tanks from communist Czechoslovakia, and diplomatically recognised the People's Republic of China.

Prime Minister Eden tried persuading the British public of the need for war, and attempted World War II-era patriotism when he compared Nasser's nationalisation of the Suez Canal with the nationalism of Benito Mussolini and Adolf Hitler of twenty years earlier, however, the very first dictatorial comparisons, of Nasser with 1930s dictators, during the crisis were by the Labour Party (UK) Opposition leader, Hugh Gaitskell. Eden had staunchly opposed Neville Chamberlain's appeasement policies, claiming that a forceful display was needed to prevent Nasser becoming an expansionist military threat.

Arab Economic Pressure on Israel In order to pressure Israel, the Arab world commenced a series of economic sanctions against it in the early 1950s. Amongst other actions, Israel's neighbors all but sealed their borders, and thoroughly severed all forms of transportation and communication across them. The Arab world closed its ports to Israeli shipping, as well as to ships originating from or destined for Israeli ports. This action made shipping to Israel almost unfeasible, since Israel would have to be the only stop in the region for a ship which anchored there. All flights departing from, landing in or passing through Israel were forbidden from passing over Arab air space. Individuals who had an Israeli visa in their passport were refused entry into Arab countries. Arab governments also pursued a campaign designed to dissuade private companies from doing business with Israel, and put a good deal of pressure on other governments to participate in their embargo. In July, 1950, Egypt passed a law requiring that the captains of ships passing through Egyptian ports guarantee that their cargo was intended for local consumption at their port of immediate destination. These restrictions were designed to prevent such cargo from being shipped to Israel from neutral ports. While all these measures had some effect on the Israeli economy,Howard M. Sachar. A History of Israel from the Rise of Zionism to Our TimePublished by Alfred A. Knopf (New York). 1976. pp. 453-6. ISBN 0-394-28564-5. Israel's economic growth nevertheless remained strong. Israel's economic growth: success without security - MERIA Journal Vol. 6 No. 3 September 2002

Egyptian Arms Deal In 1955, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser imported arms from the Soviet bloc to build his arsenal for the confrontation with Israel. He announced it on August 31, 1955:Egypt has decided to dispatch her heroes, the disciples of pharaoh and the sons of Islam and they will cleanse the Land of Israel. ... There will be no peace on Israel's border because we demand vengeance, and vengeance is Israel's death.

Under the terms of this deal, Czechoslovakia sold Egypt 200 tanks, 150 artillery pieces, 120 MiG jet fighters, 50 jet bombers, 20 transport planes, 15 minesweepers, 2 destroyers, 2 submarines, hundreds of vehicles and thousands of modern rifles and machine guns. Although the arms were to be delivered promptly, Egypt paid for them over the span of twelve years with shipments of cotton to the Soviet bloc. This volume of arms was unlike any the Middle East had ever seen, and it was coupled with the sale of 100 tanks, 100 MiG fighters and hundreds of other items to Syria, as well as the provision of Soviet and Czechoslovakian trainers and assistance personnel. This sudden change in local balance of power pressured Israel to act quickly, and acted as a catalyst to the Suez Canal Crisis.Howard M. Sachar. A History of Israel from the Rise of Zionism to Our TimePublished by Alfred A. Knopf (New York). 1976. p. 474. ISBN 0-394-28564-5.

Egyptian Influence in the Arab World Nasser's apparent role in the dismissal of British military leader Glubb Pasha in Jordan prior to the canal company nationalization had greatly annoyed British Prime Minister Anthony Eden.

The French were befouled by Nasser's support for Muslim insurgents in French Algeria. Similar to the British, the French news called Nasser a "dictator".

Anglo-Franco-American Diplomacy The The Free World opened a discussion on August 1, with a tripartite meeting at 10 Downing Street between British Foreign Affairs Secretary Selwyn Lloyd, U.S. Ambassador Robert Daniel Murphy and French Foreign Affairs Minister Christian Pineau Le Canal de Suez et la nationalisation par le Colonel Nasser, Les Actualité Française - AF, 08.01.1956

Soon an alliance was formed between Eden and French Prime Minister Guy Mollet, with headquarters based in London. Chief of Staff was made of General Stockwell and Admiral Barjot. The United Kingdom sought cooperation with the United States throughout 1956 to deal with what it maintained was a threat of Israeli attack against Egypt, to little effect.

Between July and October 1956, unsuccessful initiatives encouraged by the United States were made to reduce the tensions that would ultimately lead to war. International conferences were organized to secure agreement on canal operations; all were ultimately fruitless.

Meanwhile, France used its secret connection with Israel, which was the only option for British-French joint intervention, even though the United States nuclear umbrella was deactivated. French Minister of Defense archives ECPAD, La distribution de vivres à la population civile de Port Saïd et de Port Fouad, lors de l'expédition de Suez. MO56137A

Protocol of Sèvres Three months after Egypt's nationalization of the canal company, a secret meeting took place at Sèvres, outside Paris. Britain and France enlisted Israeli support for an alliance against Egypt. The parties agreed that Israel would invade the Sinai. Britain and France would then intervene, instructing that both the Israeli and Egyptian armies withdraw their forces to a distance of 16 Kilometer from either side of the canal. The British and French would then argue that Egypt's control of such an important route was too tenuous, and that it need be placed under Anglo-French management.

The interests of the parties were various. Britain was anxious lest it lose access to the remains of its empire. France was nervous about the growing influence that Nasser exerted on its North African colonies and protectorates. Both Britain and France were eager that the canal should remain open as an important conduit of oil. Israel wanted to reopen the canal to Israeli shipping, and saw the opportunity to strengthen its southern border and to weaken a dangerous and hostile state.

Prior to the operation Britain deliberately neglected to take counsel with the Americans, trusting instead that Nasser's engagement with communist states would persuade the Americans to accept British and French actions if they were presented as a fait accompli. This proved to be a fatal miscalculation for the colonial powers.

Invasion Operation Kadesh: The Israeli Operation in the Sinai Peninsula Israeli military planning for the operation in the Sinai hinged on four main military objectives; Sharm el-Sheikh, al-Arish, Abu Uwayulah, and the Gaza Strip. The Egyptian blockade of the Tiran Straits was based at Sharm el-Sheikh, and by capturing the town, Israel would have access to the Red Sea for the first time since 1953, which would allow it to restore the trade benefits of secure passage to the Indian Ocean. The Gaza Strip was chosen as another military objective because Israel wished to remove the training grounds for Fedayeen groups, and because Israel recognised that Egypt could use the territory as a staging ground for attacks against the advancing Israeli troops. Israel advocated rapid advances, for which a potential Egyptian flanking manoeuvre would present even more of a risk. al-Arish and Abu Uwayulah were important hubs for soldiers, equipment, and centres of command and control of the Egyptian Army in the Sinai. Capturing them would deal a deathblow to the Egyptian's strategic operation in the entire Peninsula. The capture of these four objectives were hoped to be the means by which the entire Egyptian Army would rout, and fall back into Egypt proper, which British and French forces would then be able to push up against an Israeli advance, and crush in a decisive encounter.

Early Actions in southern Sinai The Israeli's chief-of-staff, Major General Moshe Dayan, first planned to take the vital Mitla Pass. Dayan planned for the 1st Battalion, 202nd Paratroop Brigade, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Rafael Eytan, a veteran of the Israel War of Independence, and future head of the IDF; to drop at Parker's Memorial, near one of the defiles of the pass, Jebel Heitan. The rest of the brigade, under the command of Colonel Ariel Sharon would then advance to meet with the battalion, and consolidate their holdings.

On the 29 October 1956, Operation Kadesh, the conquest of the Sinai, began when the battalion dropped into the Peninsula. However, the landing had not gone as planned, and the forces were now several miles from their target, and wasted valuable hours, and physical energy, moving into their positions opposite the Egyptian positions in the pass. The Israelis then dug in, received artillery and weapons from another airlift, and awaited the rest of the brigade.

Early actions along the Gulf of Aqaba, and the central front Meanwhile, the 9th Infantry Brigade captured Ras an-Naqb, an important staging ground for that brigade's later attack against Sharm el-Sheikh. Instead of attacking the town by a frontal attack, they enveloped the town, and negotiated through some of the natural chokepoints into the rear of the town, and surprised the Egyptians before they could ready themselves to defend. The Egyptians surrendered, with no Israeli casualties sustained.

The 4th Infantry Brigade, under the command of Colonel Josef Harpaz, captured al-Qusaymah, which would be used as a jumping off point for the assault against Abu Uwayulah.

Battle of Jebel Heitan, 202nd Paratroop Brigade under attack The portion of the 202nd under Sharon's command continued to advance to meet with the 1st Brigade. En route, Sharon assaulted Themed, and was able to storm the town through the Themed Gap, and was able to capture the settlement. On the 30th, Sharon linked up with Eytan near Nakla.

Dayan had no more plans for further advances beyond the passes, but Sharon decided to attack the Egyptian positions at Jebel Heitan. Sharon would send his lightly armed paratroopers against dug-in Egyptians supported by air and heavy artillery, as well as tanks. Although the Israelis succeeded in forcing the Egyptians to retreat, the heavy casualties sustained would surround Sharon with a lot of controversy. Most of the deaths sustained by the Israelis in the entire operation, were sustained at Jebel Heitan.

Anglo-French Task Force To support the invasion, large air forces had been deployed to Cyprus and Malta by the UK and France and many aircraft carriers were deployed. The two airbases on Cyprus were so congested that a third field which was in dubious condition had to be brought into use for French aircraft. Even RAF Luqa on Malta was extremely crowded with RAF Bomber Command aircraft. The UK deployed the aircraft carriers HMS HMS Eagle (R05), HMS Albion (R07) and HMS Bulwark (R08) and France had the Arromanches (R 95) and La Fayette (R96) on station. In addition, HMS HMS Ocean (R68) and HMS Theseus (R64) acted as jumping-off points for Britain's helicopter-borne assault (the world's first). Meanwhile the Israel Border Police militarized the Israel-Jordan border (including the Green Line with the West Bank) which resulted in the killing of 48 Arab civilians by Israeli forces on October 29 (known as the Kafr Qasim massacre).

On October 30, in the morning, United Kingdom and France sent an ultimatum to Egypt. They initiated Operation Musketeer (1956) on October 31, with a bombing campaign. On November 3, 20 F4U Corsair from the 14.F and 15.F Aéronavale taking off from the Arromanches and Lafayette carriers, attacked the Cairo aerodrome. Nasser responded by sinking all 40 ships present in the canal, closing it to further shipping until early 1957.

On late November 5, the 3rd Battalion of the British Parachute Regiment (United Kingdom) dropped at El Gamil Airfield, clearing the area and establishing a secure base for incoming support aircraft and reinforcements. At first light on November 6, British Commandos of Nos 42 and 40 Commando Royal Marines stormed the beaches, using landing craft of World War II vintage (LCM Landing Craft, Mechanized). The battlegroup standing offshore opened fire, giving covering fire for the landings and causing considerable damage to the Egyptian batteries and gun emplacements. The town of Port Said sustained great damage and was seen to be alight.

. October 1956Acting in concert with British forces, 500 heavily-armed paratroopers of the French 2nd Marine Infantry Parachute Regiment (2ème RPC), hastily redeployed from combat in Algeria, jumped over the al-Raswa bridges from Nord Noratlas transports of the ET (Escadrille de Transport) 1/61 and ET 3/61, together with some combat engineers of the Guards Independent Parachute Company. Despite the loss of two soldiers, the western bridge was swiftly secured by the paras, and F4U Corsairs of the Aéronavale 14.F and 15.F flew a series of close-air-support missions, destroying several SU-100 tank destroyers. F-84Fs also hit two large oil storage tanks in Port Said, which went up in flames and covered most of the city in a thick cloud of smoke for the next several days. Egyptian resistance varied, with some positions fighting back until destroyed, while others were abandoned with little resistance.

In the afternoon, 522 additional French paras of the 1er REP (Régiment Étranger Parachutiste, 1st French Foreign Legion Parachute Regiment) were dropped near Port Fouad. These were also constantly supported by the Corsairs of the French Aéronavale, which flew very intensive operations: for example, although the French carrier LaFayette developed catapult problems, no less than 40 combat sorties were completed. In total, 10 French soldiers were killed and 30 injured during the landing and the subsequent battles.

British commandos of No. 45 Commando assaulted by helicopter, meeting stiff resistance, with shore batteries striking several helicopters, while friendly fire from British carrier-borne aircraft caused heavy casualties to 45 Commando and HQ. Street fighting and house clearing, with strong opposition from well-entrenched Egyptian sniper positions, caused further casualties.

End of Hostilities The operation to take the canal was highly successful from a military point of view, but was a political disaster due to external forces. Along with Suez, the United States was also dealing with the near-simultaneous Soviet Union-1956 Hungarian revolution, and faced the public relations embarrassment of criticizing the Soviet Union's military intervention there while at the same time avoiding criticism of its two principal European allies' actions. Perhaps more significantly, the United States also feared a wider war after the Soviet Union leader Nikita Khrushchev threatened to intervene on the Egyptian side and launch attacks by "all types of weapons of destruction" on London and Paris.

Thus, the President Eisenhower forced a cease-fire on Britain and France which it had previously told the Allies it would not do. The U.S. demanded that the invasion stop and sponsored resolutions in the UN Security Council for a cease-fire to stop the invasion. Britain and France, as permanent members of the Security Council, vetoed the resolutions in the UN Security Council. The U.S. then appealed to the United Nations General Assembly and proposed a resolution calling for a cease-fire and a withdrawal of forces under the terms of Uniting for Peace (UfP). The General Assembly held an emergency session and passed the UfP resolution. Britain and France withdrew from Egypt within a week.Z Magazine, April 2, 2003, http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?SectionID=1&ItemID=3376 last visited 2/28/07

Part of the pressure that the United States used against Britain was financial, as President Eisenhower threatened to sell the United States Reserve currency of the British pound and thereby precipitate a collapse of the British currency. After Saudi Arabia started an oil embargo against Britain and France, the U.S. refused to fill the gap, until Britain and France agreed to a rapid withdrawal.Kennett Love, Suez: The Twice-Fought War, New York: McGraw Hill, 1969, p.651 There was also a measure of discouragement for Britain in the rebuke by the Commonwealth of Nations Prime Ministers Louis St. Laurent of Canada and Robert Menzies of Australia at a time when Britain was still continuing to regard the Commonwealth as an entity of importance as the residue of the British Empire and as an automatic supporter in its effort to remain a world power.

The British government and the Pound Sterling thus both came under pressure. Eden was forced to resign and announced a cease fire on November 6, warning neither France nor Israel beforehand. Troops were still in Port Said when the order came from London. Without further guarantee, the Anglo-French Task Force had to finish withdrawing by December 22, 1956, to be replaced by Denmark and Colombian units of the United Nations Emergency Force. Service Cinématographique des Armées SCA reportage de Paul Corcuff, December 22nd 1956 French Ministry of Defense arcvhives ECPAD MO56141AR14 The Israelis left the Sinai in March, 1957.

Introduction of UN Peacekeepers Before the withdrawal, Lester B. Pearson, who would later become the Prime Minister of Canada, had gone to the United Nations and suggested creating a United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) in the Suez to "keep the borders at peace while a political settlement is being worked out." The United Nations accepted this suggestion, and after several days of tense diplomacy, a neutral force not involving the United States, Britain, France or most of the Soviet Bloc was sent with the consent of Nasser, stabilizing conditions in the area. Pearson was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1957 for his efforts. The United Nations Peacekeeping Force was Pearson's creation and he is considered the father of the modern concept of "peacekeeping".

Aftermath Eden's resignation marked, until the Falklands War, the last significant attempt Britain made to impose its military will abroad without U.S. support. However, Nigel Ashton argues "that British strategy in the region changed very little in the wake of Suez." Harold Macmillan was every bit as determined as Eden had been to stop Nasser, although he was more willing to enlist American support in the future for that end. Some argue that the crisis also marked the final transfer of power to the new superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union.

The incident demonstrated the weakness of the NATO alliance in its lack of planning and cooperation beyond the European stage. From the point of view of General Charles de Gaulle, the Suez events demonstrated that France could not rely on allies anymore. Britain withdrew its troops in the midst of the battle without warning its allies. In 1957, following these events, the French government launched an autonomous nuclear programme conducted in the Sahara,http://www.defense.gouv.fr/content/download/60823/571529/file/SAHARA.pdf Délégation à l’Information et à la Communication de la Défense: Dossier de présentation des essais nucléaireset leur suivi au Sahara, French Defense Ministry, January 2007 known as Force de frappe, as a deterrent not only against the USSR but vis-à-vis every potential threat around the globe. By 1966 de Gaulle withdrew France from the integrated NATO military command. According to the protocol of Sèvres agreements, France secretly transmitted parts of its Gerboise Bleue to Israel, including a detonator. Affaire de Suez, Le Pacte Secret, Peter Hercombe et Arnaud Hamelin, France 5/Sunset Presse/Transparence, 2006

The imposed end to the crisis signalled the definitive weakening of the United Kingdom and France as Global Powers. Nasser's standing in the Arab world was greatly improved, with his stance helping to promote pan-Arabism and reinforce hostility against Israel and the West. The crisis also arguably hastened the process of decolonization, as the remaining colonies of both Britain and France gained independence over the next several years.

After Suez, Aden and Iraq became the main bases for the British in the region while the French concentrated their forces at Bizerte and Beirut. - Israel border in 1962.UNEF was placed in the Sinai (on Egyptian territory only) with the express purpose of maintaining the cease-fire. While effective in preventing the small-scale warfare that prevailed before 1956 and after 1967, budgetary cutbacks and changing needs had seen the force shrink to 3,378 by 1967. The Egyptian government then began to Militarization the Sinai, and demanded that the UNEF withdraw. This action, along with the blockade of the Strait of Tiran, led directly to the Six Day War. During the war, Israeli armed forces captured the east bank of the canal, which subsequently became a de facto boundary between Egypt and Israel and the canal was therefore closed until June, 1975.

Bibliography

References See also

Media links

External links



Suez Crisis
Spartacus, USA History, British History, Second World War, First World War, Germany,

BBC NEWS | Middle East | Suez: End of empire
The BBC's Paul Reynolds looks at how Suez represented the last gasp of the British Empire. ... Fifty years ago the Suez Crisis erupted over the Egyptian president's decision to ...

BBC NEWS | World | Middle East | Suez: End of empire
The BBC's Paul Reynolds looks at how Suez represented the last gasp of the British Empire. ... Fifty years ago the Suez Crisis erupted over the Egyptian president's decision to ...

The Suez Crisis
26 July 1956 The Egyptian President, Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser, announces the Egyptian nationalisation of the Suez Canal and its operating Suez Canal Company in retaliation ...

Suez Crisis
Main Index | | TopTerm Index | | Term Index | Prev Term: Strategic Defence Initiative Next Term: Summit Meeting Suez Crisis

The Suez Crisis
The Suez Crisis and the British Empire (July 1956) One of the signal events for the dissolution of the British Empire after the conclusion of the Second World War took place in ...

Suez Crisis - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
The Suez Crisis [1] (Arabic: أزمة السويس - العدوان الثلاثي ‎; French: Crise du canal de Suez; Hebrew: מבצע קדש ‎) (Kadesh Campaign) was a ...

The Cold War::
The diplomatic background to the Suez Crisis of 1956

The Suez Crisis of 1956::
The military conflict in Egypt over the Suez Canal in 1956 is assessed here. The military attack on Egypt in 1956 was very successful but was a disaster politically. The military ...

Suez Crisis
GlobalSecurity.org is the leading source for reliable military news and military information, directed by John Pike

 

Suez Crisis



 
Copyright © 2008 Hintcenter.com - All rights reserved.
Home | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy
All Trademarks belong to their repective owners. Many aspects of this page are used under
commercial commons license from Yahoo!